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Two Years and Counting: Land Use and Louisiana's
Post-Katrina Recovery
John J. Costonis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana has now passed the second anniversary of the
Katrina-Rita onslaught, the most punishing natural disaster in the
nation's history. The severity of the state's hurricane-driven losses
has stimulated unprecedented receptivity to fresh ideas and fresh
solutions for problems that the hurricanes mercilessly exposed, but
did not create. This report addresses selected legal issues in the
state's land use and coastal management system that will
inevitably surface in any post-recovery scenario. The report's
modest but essential goal is to identify why these issues are
important, and what legal and structural challenges must be
addressed to resolve them.'
They derive from pre- and post-Katrina sources. The major
pre-Katrina source is Louisiana's land use governance system,
which is largely the same today as when its governing statutes
were adopted some seventy years ago.2 Excepting the latitude
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1. One purpose of this report is to serve as a point of departure for
subsequent white papers sponsored by the Louisiana Recovery Authority
Support Foundation as well as for the deliberations and February 2008 report of
a legislatively created task force. See H.R. Con. Res. 229, Reg. Sess. (La. 2007)
(directing the task force to study and advise the Office of State Planning on
implementing the recommendations of the Louisiana Speaks Plan); LA. SPEAKS,
LA. RECOVERY AuTH., LOUISIANA SPEAKS REGIONAL PLAN: VISION AND
STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH IN SouTH LOuIsIANA (2007)
[hereinafter LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN]. It is hoped that the report will also
prove useful for the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority as it takes on
the expanded duties assigned it in conjunction with its establishment by Act 8.
See 2005 La. Acts No. 8.
2. For a detailed review of the glacial evolution of the state's land use
enabling legislation, see ROD E. EMMER, ANNE RHEAMS, & F. WAGNER,
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enjoyed by Louisiana's home rule parishes and cities,3 Louisiana's
current zoning and planning legislation is a child of the era of
speakeasies, Huey Long, and Herbert Hoover.4 Unfortunately, this
state of affairs is as much a consequence of Louisiana's ingrained
antipathy to planning as it is a cause of the freeze.5 Absent a
reversal of this posture, the path to land use reform will be difficult
to navigate.
But dramatic post-Katrina developments signal that the state's
policymakers now appreciate that planning conducted within the
framework of a well-conceived system of land use law is one of
the missing links in the state's recovery program. Driving these
developments is the determination to encourage, if not demand a
greater role for regional and state engagement in land use decisions
OFFSHORE PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
PROCESS, OCS STUDY MMS 92-0064 (1992).
3. For a discussion of the relationship between local land use powers and
the Louisiana Constitution's home rule provisions, see id. at 24-26. A number
of Louisiana's home rule cities and parishes have implemented land use
measures that substantially outpace their entitlements under the state's general
land use enabling legislation.
4. Louisiana's zoning municipal enabling statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
33:4721-34 (2007), actually derives from a model zoning act prepared by the
United States Commerce Department under Herbert Hoover. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ENABLING ZONING ACT (1926).
5. See Stephen D. Villavaso, Planning Enabling Legislation in Louisiana:
A Prospective Analysis into the Next Millennium, 48 LOY. L. REV. 229, 250
(2000) (observing that a "vast number of localities have made no allowance for
future growth and a number of parishes still do not have any of the most
rudimentary of planning tools, such as a land use plan, a zoning map, a zoning
ordinance, or, in some cases, subdivision regulations"). Writing eight years
earlier on the status of Louisiana's regulation of the destructive impacts on
Louisiana's coast of offshore petroleum development, a study team concluded
that "planning" was in reality a "reactionary process," and that, beyond federal
and state guidelines, "little coordinated planning was actually accomplished and
most communities still lacked comprehensive plans and the ability to formulate
them." See EMMER, RHEAMS, & WAGNER, supra note 2, at 43. Commenting on
the results of its polling of citizens and stakeholders, Louisiana Speaks observed
that there was "little faith in major political institutions," and that the "lack of
confidence in all levels of the political system posed significant challenges for
the planning recovery efforts." LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, app. A
at 6 and 23.
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of multi-parish significance. This determination undergirds the
formation of Louisiana's Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority (CPRA) 6 and the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), 7
authorship of the CPRA Master Plan8 and an LRA-affiliated
Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan,9 levee board regionalization and
consolidation,' 0 and, derivatively, the renewed interest and
initiatives of the flood-impacted parishes and cities in upgrading
their land use planning and governance practices."
Complementary, sharply contrasting models of regional
planning undergird the CPRA and LRA legislation and master
plans. The CPRA has been endowed with assets as impressive as
those enjoyed by any of the nation's regional planning bodies: a
defined territory, broad regulatory and restoration/flood protection
powers, extensive funding, key state development and
conservation agency representation on its governing board, and
most important, unprecedented public support for its charge to
integrate hurricane protection and coastal restoration in its
planning, regulatory, and infrastructure location missions. 12
The CPRA Plan describes its mission as comprehending one of
"the largest public works programs our nation has ever
undertaken,"' 13 and the project itself as one whose costs will run
into the "tens of billions of dollars."' 14 "Aggressive state leadership
and direction"'15 is pledged, as is the commitment that the "full
6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:213.1-.12 (2007).
7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:220.1-.5 (2007).
8. COASTAL PROTECTION AND RESTORATION AUTH., INTEGRATED
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION AND HURRICANE PROTECTION: LOUISIANA'S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2007)
[Hereinafter CPRA MASTER PLAN].
9. See generally LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1.
10. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 38.
11. These developments are monitored at www.louisianaspeaks.org.
12. Commenting on the results of its citizen and stakeholder polling,
Louisiana Speaks observes that the "issue of coastal and wetlands restoration is
perhaps the most unifying long-term planning issue of all, as it enjoys near-
universal support across the region." LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, at
16.
13. CPRA MASTER PLAN, supra note 8, at 15.
14. Id. at 92.
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:213.1(D) (2007).
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police power of the state shall be exercised to meet immediate and
compelling necessity."'
16
To accomplish its expanded mission, the CPRA will need these
resources and at least two others. The first is to plug in a
planning/land use law module as the third component of a flood
protection/coastal conservation/planning law core. Without it, the
CPRA's selection and location of flood protection and restoration
projects and parish/municipal land use policies will likely
undermine rather than support one another. 17  The second is
institutionalizing within the CPRA's leadership and staff structure
the confidence and capability to address the difficult land use
planning and legal issues that "aggressive state leadership and
direction" will require.I1
Through its Louisiana Speaks affiliate, the LRA has offered a
model of state-to-local land use planning overseen by a revamped
Office of State Planning endowed with powers to reinforce CPRA
initiatives, to coordinate planning and capital facility endeavors, to
provide technical planning assistance at the state, regional, and
local governmental levels, and to implement the Louisiana Speaks
Regional Plan. 19 Implementation of these initiatives will take a
different path than the one considered for the CPRA Plan because
the LRA is expected to be sun-setting at the time the CPRA is
ramping up. 20 Louisiana Speaks and its LRA adherents face the
burden, therefore, of persuading the legislature to establish a new
governmental custodian of the Louisiana Speaks Plan. The
legislature's Concurrent Resolution calling for a task force to study
the Plan's Office of State Planning proposal is a milestone in this
effort.2'
Many of Louisiana's coastal parishes and cities have likewise
embraced dramatic planning initiatives, as the Louisiana Speaks
16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:213.10(A) (2007).
17. The risk, if not certainty, of the incompatibility of the two levels of
activity is recognized in the CPRA plan. See CPRA MASTER PLAN, supra note
8, at 105.
18. The need for a "structure to support implementation of the Master Plan"
is also identified by the CPRA. Id. at 112.
19. See LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, at 79-91.
20. Interview with Sean Reilly, LRA Board Member (April 16, 2007).
21. H.R. Con. Res. 229, Reg. Sess. (La. 2007).
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website details. Updating their land use powers will assist them in
securing their goals. The Louisiana Speaks Plan, which is as much
a compendium of current "best practices" in land use affairs as a
physical development plan for South Louisiana, affords an
excellent point of departure for state legislative consideration.
But the signs are not all positive. A throwback to the state's
deep-rooted distrust of government and planning reappeared in a
set of 2006 amendments to article I, section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution,22 which addresses the scope of permissible
uncompensated public regulation (the "taking issue") and the
conditions governing the state's use of its eminent domain power.
The amendments seek to tame the United States' Supreme Court's
approval in Kelo v. City of New London23 of eminent-domain based
economic development projects.
A reasonable interpretation of their purpose is to achieve the
elimination of "economic development" as a public purpose
supporting article I, section 4 expropriations, thereby bringing
Louisiana in line with the position argued by Justice O'Connor in
her Kelo dissent.24 But the amendment's ambiguous language is
open to interpretations that could cripple eminent domain's use on
behalf of Louisiana's recovery.
25
Resolution of the land use powers and eminent domain
questions will shape the legal and, quite likely, policy framework
for Louisiana's post-Katrina land use system for years to come.
Confirmation that they merit our attention appeared throughout my
interviews with twenty-five public officials and civic leaders. 26
All agreed that the foremost issue now confronting the
recovery effort is the establishment of a land use structure
muscular enough to preserve and implement the outcomes
envisaged by the CPRA and Louisiana Speaks Plans. Likewise, all
were apprehensive that the marriage of pre-Katrina uncertainties
22. The amendments were presented to and approved by Louisiana voters as
Amendments 5 and 6 on September 30, 2006. Act 851 amended article 1,
section 4(B)(1)-(6) and article VI, section 21. Act 859 added a new section
4(G)(1)-(4) to article I, section 4. The amendments are discussed infra Part III.
23. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
24. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra app.
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over the "taking issue" with the now unsettled status of eminent
domain threatens the evolution of land use measures capable of
meeting Louisiana's recovery needs.
II. REGIONALISM IN LAND USE: ITS VARIANTS AND ITS CHALLENGES
A. Realism About Regionalism
Strategies for reforming outdated land use legislation must
begin with an understanding of how individuals and local
governments behave, not how reformers would like them to
behave. Richard Babcock, my zoning mentor of forty years ago,
upset the reformers of his time on this score with his classical
article, "Let's Stop Romancing Regionalism." 27 Dick's thesis-
that so long as legal and political power is anchored at the local
and the state levels, regional values are unlikely to take root-is, I
fear, as valid in Louisiana today as when Dick announced it.
Property owners are loathe to surrender freedom to use their
property as they wish. Local governments jealously guard their
land use powers from intrusion from above. Proposals to shift land
use powers upwards, therefore, must confront both sources of
resistance.
These objections explain the paucity of successful regional
programs throughout the United States. But they seem to have an
even sharper bite in Louisiana. The deep-seated libertarianism of
many of the state's citizens-a throwback perhaps to a time in the
South when the population was largely rural and wealth was
founded predominantly in and from the land-abhors public
restriction of private land use. The profound distrust with which
many Louisianans regard government, the would-be author of
these limitations,28 intensifies this resistance.
In an economically stressed but land-rich and sparsely
populated state eager to attract development, moreover, reluctance
to impose demanding land use restrictions-whether local or
regional-is not surprising. These factors probably help explain
the rudimentary nature of rural Louisiana land use controls. They
27. RICHARD F. BABCOCK, BILLBOARDS, GLASS HOUSES AND THE LAW 11
(1977).
28. See supra note 5.
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certainly figure in the on-going eleventh-hour scramble of parishes
in the St. Tammany to East Baton Rouge quadrant to armor
themselves with master plans, zoning, and subdivision ordinances
in the face of their sudden urbanization.
Louisiana's geographic and cultural fragmentation undoubtedly
enters the picture as well. The state's general land use statute is
criss-crossed with countless local and special laws designed to
tailor generic practices to local taste, custom, and tolerance of land
use controls. The patchwork evidences, in turn, the power in the
state legislature of local delegations, keen to resist any regional
initiative that threatens local control. When addressing such
matters, in fact, the legislature often seems more a clamor of local
duchies than a body unified in the pursuit of state or regional
values.
These obstacles can be overcome, particularly in the auspicious
post-Katrina atmosphere that now prevails in Louisiana. But it
will not be a walk in the park. I would venture that the elements
leading to success are likely to be political leadership, especially
from the governor's office, prudent selection of the powers
necessary to implement the regional values, and a strong case,
honestly and patiently presented.
B. Land Use Powers and Local Governments
Regionalism adherents often fail to acknowledge that local
governments should enjoy broad local land use powers. The fact is
that most parish/municipal land use decisions do not address
problems rising to the level of regional or state import. In fact,
distinguishing between issues of "local" versus "regional" or
"state" concern, and leaving the local issues to the locals is the
path to legal, no less than to political wisdom. Louisiana is a home
rule state whose courts will not respond kindly to legislative
intrusions into local affairs.29
Equally important is assessing ways in which regional or state
agencies can assist local governments short of preempting local
governance through mandates. While sometimes overstated, the
claims that local government is closest to those impacted by land
29. See infra Part II.C.4.
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use decisions and subject to their wrath (or praise) are both true
and worthy. Nor should the healthy role that local determination
of a community's land use character plays in nourishing
community identity and solidarity be ignored.
But Katrina and Rita demonstrated that regional and state
agencies can assist local planning and land use management of
local matters without themselves managing or preempting local
control. One route is providing or facilitating the provision of
funding for such local infrastructure needs as schools, police, and
fire stations.
A second is providing the technical assistance required by
many Louisiana parishes and smaller communities for the most
conventional of truly local land use controls-comprehensive
master plans, zoning and subdivision ordinances, and the like.
Interviews with regional planning commission directors revealed
that despite the "local" focus of these activities, local governments
eagerly sought and willingly accepted the assistance that the
"regional" commissions provided to them. Local governments
often cannot afford planning staffs or other local sources of
expertise. Even when both are present, regional observers
commented, regional entities often served to untangle political
stalemates among local groups that would otherwise block
desirable land use programs or actions.
Closely related to the second route is a third in which the
technical assistance encourages local governments to adopt "best
practices" in their land use systems. Again, "best practices" may
cover "local" issues as well as regional matters. Illustrative of this
genre of assistance is Louisiana Speaks' goal of aiding local
governments to incorporate "smart growth" and "new urbanist"
principles in their land use codes, 30 and its proposal that a State
Planning Office, along with existing regional planning bodies,
undertake a similar function.3'
30. See LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, at 40-41, 47-76.
31. Id. at 90-91.
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C. "Regionalizing" (Some) Land Use Powers and Values: Three
Complementary Models
1. The "Regional Dimension " in Land Use Control
When does a land use problem become "regional"?
Two classical formulations define land use's regional
dimension in relation to regulation of "areas of critical state
concern" (ACSC) and of "developments of regional impact"
(DRI). Illustrative of an ACSC is the Florida Everglades, which is
as ecologically embattled as Louisiana's coastal areas, and the
focus of a restoration program bearing notable parallels to the
CPRA program. DRI's include airports and other growth
generating mega-projects of the kind eagerly sought for the state
by the Department of Economic Development.
This report's working definition of "regional" land use activity,
which encompasses ACSC's and DRI's, is one that
a. generates substantial land use impacts that extend
beyond the boundaries of a single parish;
b. requires the participation of the state or of political
subdivisions beyond the parish alone for balanced and
effective management of these impacts; and
c. affects public health, safety and welfare with sufficient
intensity to justify the state's direct or delegated use of its
police power to mandate the utilization of regional values
in management of the activity.
32
The CPRA and Louisiana Speaks Plans set forth land use
initiatives meeting these criteria. CPRA's coastal restoration and
hurricane protection goals are shoo-in candidates. The coastal
zone sweeps along and upland from the Gulf from Mississippi to
Texas. Absorbing the restoration/protection project costs or
engaging in effective and balanced management of this vast area
would obviously overwhelm any of the constituent parishes. The
intensity of Louisiana's custodial obligations to the region is
evident in the briefest sampling of the Plan's goals: protecting area
32. See infra note 35 for the relationship between this criterion and the risk
that indiscriminate regionalization of land use powers may run afoul of home
rule units' constitutional immunities.
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residents and the coast's multiple economic assets; nurturing the
area's ecologically stressed fisheries and wildlife habitats; and
preserving the unique culture and folklore of the coastal
population.
33
The Louisiana Speaks Plan aims for a more diffuse set of
regional values. But the Plan's transportation initiative, which
among other elements envisages light rail connections between
New Orleans and Baton Rouge, is a model of a "regional" land use
initiative. It envisions high-cost, high-impact linear resources the
construction of which obviously exceeds the financial or
management capabilities of any of the individual parishes through
which they cross.
Louisiana policymakers have available no less than three
complementary models for implementing regional values which
are here labeled the Italian City-State, the Functional, and the
Aspirational Models. They find their parallels, respectively, in the
Councils of Government, CPRA and Louisiana Speaks formats.
2. The Italian City-State Model: Intergovernmental
Cooperation
From the fall of the Roman Empire to the founding of the
Italian nation in 1860, "Italy" was an area whose regions were
dominated by city-states. The city-states engaged one another
either through warfare or cooperative agreements negotiated
among sovereigns with occasional oversight of the Holy Roman
Emperor or the Pope.
A variant of the city-state model is found today in Louisiana in
the use of regional venues afforded by a region's multi-parish
Regional Planning Commission, Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO), or similar council-of-governments entity.
Depending upon the venue, the role of Pope or Emperor might fall
to a state development agency such as the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development in the case of MPO's. It might
also be left vacant, as in the case of the state's eight regional
planning commissions (when not acting as MPO's).
33. See CPRA MASTER PLAN, supra note 8, at 37-39.
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Regional interests enter into the picture principally through
negotiations among the region's city- (or parish-) states, if I may,
premised on common interests in particular land use policies or
projects. Their negotiations are facilitated by the regional
organization's staff and representatives of the state agency, who
may double as Pope or Emperor if the agreement requires funding
or planning approvals provided by that agency, the legislature, or
the federal government.
This is lowest common denominator, unromantic regionalism,
the kind that calls for negotiations as tough as those between
divorcing spouses. But it is one form of regionalism nonetheless.
Its downside is the necessity that the agreement be voluntary.
There will be desirable regional policies that the city-states will not
be prepared to support, and that must be managed, therefore, under
other regional models or not at all. Viewed through the prism of
Louisiana's localist tradition, however, the model's downside
could be its upside. It promises to capture those areas of potential
agreement among the city-states that might otherwise go begging,
and it is likely to assure that what was agreed to will in fact
happen. Purists should not snort at these advantages.
When agreement can be reached, the model is more efficient
than other alternatives. Assuming consent to an intergovernmental
land use initiative requiring the legislature's approval, for example,
the multi-parish legislative delegations will find it easier to secure
this approval than if called upon to sponsor or support a state-wide
land use reform bill lacking the prior negotiated consent of the
state's parishes. Also auguring the likely success of the agreement
will be the blessing of pertinent regional planning
authorities/MPO's and business groups.
The trick, of course, is to identify policies or projects that will
move the city-states to voluntary agreement. Such opportunities
do arise from time to time, however, particularly when outlined in
such documents as the Louisiana Speaks Plan. The Plan is rich in
planning/land use projects such as those linking Baton Rouge and
New Orleans on one axis, and 1-12 Corridor city-states (Hammond,
Baton Rouge, Lafayette and Lake Charles) on another. The
emergence of similar opportunities can be anticipated for the city-
states of Central and North Louisiana if the Louisiana Speaks'
2008] 359
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proposal that these areas also formulate a regional plan or plans is
adopted.
The Louisiana Constitution's intergovernmental provision,
article VI, section 20, affords a generous predicate for the city-state
model in its statement that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,
political subdivisions may perform any authorized power or
function jointly or in cooperation with other political subdivisions
or the United States." A companion statute35 amplifies the
provision's generous scope through the imposing breadth of its
sanctioned activities and projects.
3. The Functional Model: The CPRA in Present (and
Prospective) Action
The functional model features three components: designation
of a territorial area, a rationale that supports the designation and
establishes a land-use based mission for the area, and a custodial
agency endowed with planning, regulatory, and development
powers.
34. See LOUIsIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, at 84.
35. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:1324 (2007). It enables political
subdivisions to employ intergovernmental agreements for the "promotion and
maintenance of any undertaking or exercise of any power," so long as at least
one of the parties to the agreement is authorized by a special or general law to
perform the activity or exercise the power or function. Id. Matters that may be
addressed in these agreements include police and fire protection, health care,
public utility services, roads and transport, recreation, education, and flood and
navigation control. Id. Another statute allows the cooperating governments to
appropriate funds, levy taxes and issue bonds to finance the jointly pursued
activity or project. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:1331 (2007). Article VI, section
15 of the state constitution provides that local governing authorities enjoy broad
powers over any agency created by it; article VI, section 16 enables governing
authorities, upon public vote, to merge or consolidate any special district, local
public agency, or similar entity. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:9021(6)
(2007) (allowing local governments to engage in cooperative ventures with one
another). Useful, if somewhat outdated, studies of the permissible scope of
intergovernmental arrangements include Kathleen W. Marcel & Joseph T.
Bockrath, Regional Governments and Coastal Zone Management in Louisiana,
40 LA. L. REV. 887 (1980); Marc J. Hershman & Marsha M. Mistric, Coastal
Zone Management and State-Local Relations Under the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 22 LOY. L. REv. 273 (1975).
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The CPRA, its founding statute,36 and its Master Plan fit neatly
within this model. The area addressed in the CPRA Plan is the
Coastal Zone and contiguous areas subject to storm surge.37 The
Plan's coast-wide objectives are reduction of economic losses from
storm-based flooding, promotion of a sustainable coastal
ecosystem, provision of habitats suitable for an array of
commercial and recreational activities, and maintenance of the
region's unique cultural and historic communities.3' The CPRA,
strategically located in the Office of the Governor, is led by the
director of the Governor's Office of Coastal Activities. State
development agencies and levee boards are well-represented on
CPRA's seventeen member board. Coastal restoration and coastal
zone management responsibilities fall to the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), while flood protection infrastructure is managed
by the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD)39.
The regionalism of the Functional Model begins at a different
level, and is more expansive than the City-State Model's
regionalism. The latter, as earlier noted, works up from and is
limited by its lowest common denominator perspective of local
interests. Its local governmental participants neither create a
jurisdiction nor exercise power as jurisdictional representatives.
Under the functional model, the legislature does create a
jurisdiction for regulatory and development purposes and appoints
the custodial body that will exercise planning, regulatory, and
developmental powers within it.
The regional values are the model's raison d'etre and, in fact,
may and usually do engage state and federal dimensions as well.
In addition to overseeing coastal restoration and flood protection
within the Coastal Zone's boundaries, for example, the CPRA also
coordinates an array of state-level development and conservation
programs as well as those of such federal agencies as the Corps of
Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Department of the Interior. These state and national values may
alternatively be labeled "regional," where that term denotes supra-
36. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:213.1-.12 (2007).
37. See § 49:213.2(2).
38. CPRA MASTER PLAN, supra note 8, at 37-39.
39. § 49:213.1(D).
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municipal/parish values, or "state" or "national" values that the
CPRA coordinates and infuses into its geographically regional
activities.
The CPRA challenges of "aggressive state leadership," of fully
exercising the police power to meet "immediate and compelling
needs," and of administering the nation's largest public works
program are not for the timid. They will call for additional
legislation, the highest priority of which will be to furnish the
planning/law element to the CPRA's existing coastal restoration
and hurricane protection capabilities.
The CPRA Plan wisely anticipates the need to transform the
transitional team that prepared the Plan into a permanent staff,
fully endowed with the professional expertise to address all three
functions.40 The Plan also worries about how to align the parish
and municipal land use plans and decisions with the CPRA's
program. 4' Finally, it is aware that its future will be one of
continuing judgment calls concerning private property rights,42 the
scope of the police power, and the role of appropriation and
eminent domain (quick take or otherwise) in its land management
and acquisition program.43
How these tasks should be managed is a question that exceeds
the scope of this introductory paper. But several preliminary
comments may prove useful.
An adept and knowledgeable land use planning and law
presence must be created within the restructured staff. I am less
sanguine than the Plan's authors that, left to themselves, coastal
parishes will zone as a "means of protecting coastal wetlands" or
that they will "enact region-wide zoning."4 Louisiana's coastal
40. CPRA MASTER PLAN, supra note 8, at 112.
41. Id. at 105.
42. Id. at 107.
43. Id. at 107-08.
44. Id. at 105. Reference to "zoning" alone severely understates the
complexity of the land use challenges associated with CPRA/Ilocal government
planning and land use coordination and the CPRA's vital role in shaping this
coordination. Despite contrary popular perception, zoning is simply one, and
hardly the most influential, of a variety of tools used to implement
comprehensive master plans when contrasted with the powers of the CPRA over
the formulation of the coastal Master Plan and the selection, financing, and
location of key elements of the coastal zone's infrastructure. For example, the
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crisis has been headline news for at least three decades now, and
the parishes haven't legally addressed it yet. As the Plan
acknowledges and as the New Orleans East flooding debacle
confirms, constructing new hurricane protection systems will
"encourage unwise development into high risk areas."4 5  Even
parishes that possess the political will to adopt such zoning,
moreover, will lack the technical skills to do so.
The CPRA now faces a path-breaking challenge to re-center
land use around a risk management axis, and to share the fruits of
this novel and complex task with the coast's local governments.46
To do so, it requires the capacity to construct a matrix of land use
values into which risk management considerations are factored.
This matrix would then provide a basis, on the front end, for
selecting among the various conservation and flood protection
projects that it conceives or that are proposed to it in the coastal
zone. Subsequently, the matrix will serve to insure that parish and
municipal land use plans and decisions comport with the
hydrological and other requirements of the projects, as built.
The coastal zone's local governments should be welcomed as
key stakeholders in this process by, for example, incorporating a
Council of Coastal Zone Governments as an integral part of the
planning process. Local voices must be heard. But the scope and
costs of the coastal restoration and protection mission that lies
ahead preclude a process in which they, rather than the CPRA,
zoning powers of local governments are (or, at least, should be viewed as)
significant, but certainly not the dominant tool shaping the area's development
patterns. To achieve its legislatively declared goals, the CPRA Master Plan
cannot simply be an engineering or public works document; rather, it must be a
blueprint for coastal conservation and flood protection and for coastal area
development patterns that are driven by and reinforce both.
45. Id.
46. An example of risk-based land use management principles appears in
the Urban Land Institute's draft report on rebuilding New Orleans, in which
hydrologic/flood risk criteria dominate by a factor of seven to three other criteria
designed to divide the city into zones from highest to lowest priority for the
purpose of resettlement and redevelopment policies. Urban Land Inst., A
Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, Louisiana 49 (2005), http://law.wustl.edu/
landuselaw/Articles/ULIDraftNewOrleans%2OReport.pdf.
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ultimately determine the restoration, protection, and land use
parameters that shape Louisiana's coast of the future.
No one should minimize the political, eco-scientific,
engineering, land use planning, and legal difficulties attending this
charge. It is indeed unprecedented. But the state does not have
any other choice if it truly intends to exercise the "aggressive
leadership" to which its legislature and Governor have committed
it as a basis for attracting the equally unprecedented national
support required to meet "immediate and compelling needs." If
consensus fears about global warming prove out, moreover, how
Louisiana manages this mission can serve as a model for all of the
globe's estuaries or seacoast areas. Absent an expanded CPRA
land use planning capability, neither achievement is possible.
The CPRA will also need an internal legal capability to manage
the complex private and public property law issues that await its
attention.47 Private land law in the coastal areas is a complex
patchwork of principles, many still unsettled, scattered throughout
the Louisiana Constitution, Civil Code, statutes, and jurisprudence.
Included are topics as varied as accretion, dereliction, alluvion,
rights of reclamation, riparian servitude, public trust lands, and the
division of surface and mineral rights.48
The principal public law issues derive from two sources:
regulatory controls and physical public access to, occupation, or
disturbance of private property. At stake in both instances is
whether the CPRA may conduct these activities on a non-
compensated basis under the state's police power. If not, the
activity will be deemed a compensable "taking" or "damaging"
under Louisiana Constitution article I, section 4, or a taking under
the Federal Fifth Amendment.
47. Currently, this function is located in the Office of the Attorney General.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:213.11 (2007).
48. For the key issues, legal provisions and judicial decisions, see, for
example, Marc C. Hebert, Coastal Restoration Under CWPPRA and Property
Rights Issues, 57 LA. L. REV. 1165 (1997); James G. Wilkins & Michael
Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 861 (1992);
Richard P. Wolfe, The Appropriation of Property for Levees: A Louisiana Study
in Taking Without Just Compensation, 40 TUL. L. REV. 233 (1965); A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the Tide-A Saga of Land Titles in the Two
States: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1357 (1988).
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I anticipate that the taking/damaging issue as it arises in the
regulatory context will prove considerably less troublesome than
generally assumed. Louisiana Constitution article I, section 4
makes clear that private land use is expressly subject to the state's
police power. Article IX, section 1 as written,49 and as construed
by the Louisiana courts, 50 stresses the priority due environmental/
conservation values and the state's public trust obligations when
the legislature has adopted legislation in furtherance of both, as it
most vigorously has done in CPRA's founding statute.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's joinder of police power and
public trust reasoning in Avenal v. State,5 1 I have suggested
elsewhere, 52 presages a sea-change in Louisiana land use and
coastal management law. Justice Victory's majority opinion
invoked the joinder in concluding that a water diversion project
that largely destroyed the value of area oyster leases was not a
"taking" or "damaging" under article I, section 4.53 The public
trust doctrine, Justice Victory stated, sustains the "right of the state
to disperse fresh water ...over saltwater marshes incident to
49. The article states that the "natural resources of the state, including air
and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the people. The Legislature
shall enact laws to implement this policy." LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
50. See State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259 (La. 1994); Am. Waste &
Pollution Co. v. State, 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La.
Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
51. 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004).
52. See John J. Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in
Louisiana, 65 LA. L. REV. 1015 (2005).
53. Avenal, 886 So. 2d at 1107-08 n.28. Justice Victory's conclusions
might be dismissed as peripheral to Avenal's outcome which, viewed narrowly,
turned on other considerations, including a hold harmless clause in the
oystermen's lease and prescription of the damaging claim. I am disinclined to
agree. Not only did Justice Victory write for the majority, but a concurring
opinion of Justice Weimer supported Justice Victory's views regarding the
application of the "imminent peril" doctrine to the case's facts. Id. at 1115 n.8
(Weimer, J., concurring). The case was decided prior to the Katrina and Rita
disasters, moreover. If Justices Victory and Weimer felt it appropriate to invoke
the police power's imminent peril doctrine prior to these hurricanes, it would be
astonishing indeed if they would refuse to do so after them.
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forestalling coastal erosion."54 The police power's actual necessity
doctrine, he added, permits severe intrusions on private property
interests when necessary to offset grave public harm. 55  He
concluded that even if a measure prohibits all economically
beneficial uses of land,
compensation is not owed if the state action is in accord
with a "background principle" [such as the public trust or
actual necessity doctrine] of the state's property law that
already prohibits the landowner from the use he claimed
was taken, or is undertaken in the exercise of the state's
police power.
56
The physical access or occupation context could present an
insuperable test if the occupation is permanent57 and a stem test if
temporary58 because the judiciary places a premium on the private
landowner's right to exclude the personal property or the presence
of others from his property. The CPRA's wisest course in the
physical invasion context will often be acquisition either of the
property's full ownership or of its surface rights if some kind of
negotiated trade-off between the owner and CPRA cannot be
struck. The opportunity for these trade-offs will be frequent, as
acknowledged in Louisiana's constitution 59 and statutes,60 because
54. Id. at 1108 n.28 (majority opinion).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (statute authorizing a permanent physical occupation of plaintiff's
property is a per se taking). But even the Loretto result might be vulnerable to
Justice Victory's public trust/actual necessity reasoning, as presented
immediately above, and as reinforced by the Louisiana statute discussed infra
notes 59-60.
58. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (temporary
encroachments upon a bay within a private subdivision are takings).
59. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(A) (permitting separation of surface and
mineral rights, and permitting the state and landowner to agree to the disposition
of the mineral rights in accordance with the conditions and procedures provided
by law).
60. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 41:1702, a statute paralleling article
IX, section 4(A) of the state constitution, permits the state to allow former
riparian owners to retain mineral rights in any restored or recovered land
366 [Vol. 68
TWO YEARS AND COUNTING
the CPRA's restoration/flood protection program typically will
increase rather than destroy land values.
The world will not end when trade-off opportunities cannot be
found under circumstances that would otherwise leave the state
vulnerable to credible inverse condemnation challenges.
Systematic acquisition of private property will be as inevitable a
component of the CPRA's multi-billion dollar program as it is of
the nation's highway programs. Government could do worse than
compensating a landowner for suffering the presence on his land of
construction teams, physical installations, or other intrusions under
circumstances in which the owner incurs a genuine loss not offset
by a betterment of his land's value.
6 1
But there are considerations in play other than avoidance of
compensation. Public agencies are reluctant to force landowners to
surrender their land either through direct expropriation or through
inverse condemnation. 62 This sensitivity calls to mind in a rural
setting unhappiness with the City of New London's use of eminent
domain for urban renewal in the Kelo case.
The CPRA Plan recognizes, however, that Louisianans cannot
have it both ways: a massive national and state financial
commitment to save the state's coast, land, and communities on the
one hand, and undiminished autonomy over private land use on the
other. With decided reluctance, it anticipates the need for
conventional eminent domain to ensure the timely completion of
large projects,63 and requests that, like the state's Department of
Transportation and Development, it too be granted "quick take"
powers.
64
contiguous to or abutting a navigable water bottom in return for the owner's
surrender of its right of reclamation and surface rights.
61. Florida Everglades project management officials actually prefer outright
acquisition of title or of various types of flowage or conservation easements to a
shared public/private presence on ecologically sensitive lands. Telephone
Interview with Larry Gerry, Director, Department of Everglades Restoration
Planning (July 9, 2007).
62. See CPRA MASTER PLAN, supra note 8, at 108 ("To date, DNR has
never entertained the idea of using either form of condemnation [conventional or
quick-take] and considers both to be options of last resort.").
63. Id. at 107.
64. Id. at 108.
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There is the further complication of determining which of
various standards afford the correct measure of compensation, and
the danger, of course, of runaway eminent domain awards. The
Louisiana Constitution identifies no less than four standards for
expropriation or appropriation, three of which are further specified
by a parallel statute. Louisiana Constitution article I, section 4(B)
sets forth the basic and least predictable standard: The owner shall
be compensated "to the full extent of his loss. ' '65 Section 4(F), on
the other hand, authorizes the legislature to "place limitations on
the extent of recovery" for losses associated with coastal restoration
activities, a limit the legislature has fixed as that of the Fifth
Amendment's "just compensation." 66  Section 4(G) specifically
selects the Fifth Amendment standard for flood protection and
hurricane projects, a position reiterated in statute. 67 Lands
appropriated for levee purposes "shall be paid for as provided by
law," according to Louisiana Constitution article VI, section
42(A); the parallel statute sets that payment at "fair market value to
the full extent of loss.
' 68
Perhaps the most theoretically intriguing of these provisions is
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:214.5, which excludes any
compensation whatsoever for claims arising under leases or
permits on state lands or water bottoms from diversions of fresh
water or sediment deposited on the site for coastal conservation
purposes. On its face, the statute would appear to conflict with the
United States Supreme Court's physical occupation
jurisprudence. 69 Or it might hark back a century earlier to a United
States Supreme Court opinion that conferred extraordinary powers
and duties on government in its administration of public trust
lands.7°
65. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5).
66. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:213.10(B) (2007).
67. See § 49:213.10(G).
68. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:301(C)(1)(a) (2007).
69. See cases cited supra notes 57-58.
70. I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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4. The Aspirational Model: The Louisiana Speaks Regional
Plan
The Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan is, in fact, a number of
plans, or better yet, of plans and plan types. 71 It is a regional
geographical plan for the physical, social, and economic
development of a thirty-five parish region of Louisiana that
includes the state's nineteen coastal parishes. It is a process plan
that unveils a planning and land use implementation system
premised upon coordination by the Office of State Planning (OSP)
of a network of state, regional, and local actors. It is an advocacy
plan that seeks public and private support for implementing
legislation and for adoption of the plan's sixteen strategies, 100-
plus action items, and a host of performance benchmarks
associated with Plan recommendations.
It is an educational plan that seeks in one fell swoop to close
the gap between the rudimentary land use legislation of the Huey
Long era and a comprehensive inventory of current best land use
and planning practices ranging from a "smart growth" toolkit to the
creation and maintenance of a statewide GIS database.
It is a state plan. It envisages the preparation of geographical
regional plans for Central and North Louisiana, which will
constitute an entire geographical state plan when joined with the
current South Louisiana Plan. It empowers the OSP to coordinate
capital plans and budget requests of state agencies. The OSP is
conceived as an autonomous public/private board of
commissioners intended to be insulated from politics. An
independent, non-profit group with members across the state will
monitor and support the plan and join with the OSP's board as "the
conscience of the Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan.",72
The Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan also merits status as a
"state" plan because it locates the OSP at the top of a planning
hierarchy. Not only will this body engage its fellow state agencies,
but it will provide direction, oversight, and financial and technical
assistance to the state's various regional and local bodies. At the
bottom of the pyramid, local governments link upward to regional
71. See LOuIsIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, at 82-91.
72. Id. at 83.
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agencies and the OSP through state-mandated, 20-year local
comprehensive plans. In addition to including elements addressing
community growth, transportation, public facilities, housing,
economic development, and conservation, these plans must also be
consistent with state protection and restoration plans.
Finally, the plan is a regional plan. Louisiana Speaks
champions CPRA's Master Plan for the South Louisiana coast by
encouraging or requiring consistency between the plans and
policies of the state, regional, and local actors. The state
geographic plan, as earlier noted, is a composite of the regional
geographic plans of South, Central, and North Louisiana. The Plan
also envisages that the legislature will consolidate various regional
entities into a single agency that will integrate local government
comprehensive plans and capital facilities programs through a
combination of "Regional Strategies" and "Regional Infrastructure
Improvement Plans."
Pervasive throughout the Louisiana Speaks Plan is hostility to
sprawl. Many of its anti-sprawl prescriptions derive from studies
in the 1970's and 80's analyzing the costs of sprawl,73 the
pioneering work of such scholars as Robert Freilich 74 on the
orderly phasing of growth within downtown, suburban and
exurban rings, and the incorporation or reworking of these efforts
in contemporary "smart growth" dress. The Plan also advocates
growth-channeling policies that allocate federal and state
infrastructure and services funding for development in locations
previously determined to merit this preferential treatment through a
matrix of anti-sprawl, smart growth planning values.
75
The title "aspirational plan" is surely appropriate for the
Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan, particularly as it compares with
the Italian city-state and CPRA functional models. The gap
between what it proposes and Louisiana's traditional land use
practice far outpaces the distance between current practices and
those proposed under the other two models. The gap is barely
perceptible under the City-State model, in fact. While the gap is
substantial under the CPRA functional model, potential opposition
73. See REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE CO$TS OF SPRAWL (1974).
74. See ROBERT H. FRELICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH (2000).
75. See LOUISIANA SPEAKS PLAN, supra note 1, at 81, 86-88.
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to the CPRA's effort has already been blunted by the public's
embrace of the Plan as its best hope against storm surges to come.
The Louisiana Speaks Plan is aspirational as well in the
transformative vision it projects both of the physical character of
South Louisiana and, more sweepingly, of the upward reallocation
of land use powers. Plans, it bears re-emphasis, serve many
different purposes, only one of which is the spatial display of the
planned area's intended physical character.
In its aspirational mode, the Louisiana Speaks Plan calls to
mind the dictum of Daniel Burnham: "Make no little plans; they
have no magic to stir men's blood., 76  Whether or not the
Louisiana Speaks Plan will "stir men's blood" sufficiently to
render it politically acceptable to a state with Louisiana's localist
tradition is a question for the future.
On the legal side, it is clear that two orders of new legislation
will be required to implement the Plan. The first, addressed below,
is foundational: Will the Plan's upward powers shift run afoul of
the home rule powers possessed by many Louisiana parish and
municipal governments? The second concerns the legal issues
posed by each of the Plan's sixteen strategies and 100-plus action
items. Responding to the second question is a work for the future
that initially will engage the legislative study team and, should the
OSP proposal be adopted, the OSP itself over what no doubt will
be a lengthy period.
Reserving the home rule question for discussion below,
redistribution of the land use powers as proposed by the Louisiana
Speaks Plan should not prove to be legally problematic. Louisiana
Constitution article III, section 1 vests the state's legislative power
in its Senate and House of Representatives. We can assume that
legislation redistributing these powers will both serve and be
drafted to reasonably advance a valid public purpose. If so, the
conclusion is patent that the "state legislature may enact any law it
sees fit which is neither expressly nor impliedly restricted by the
state or federal constitutions in any area coextensive with the
state's police powers. 77
76. CARL SMITH, THE PLAN OF CHICAGO 154 (2006).
77. Marcel & Bockrath, supra note 35, at 891.
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Home rule objections may not be so easily dismissed.
Opponents will insist that the state's power to limit the land use
autonomy of home local governments has been severely limited by
article VI of the Louisiana Constitution. They will note, in
particular, that pre-1974 home rule units may adopt any legislation
that is not inconsistent with the constitution78 and that post-1974
home rule units may exercise powers that are not denied by general
law or inconsistent with this constitution. 79 Opponents will also
call into play article VI, section 17, which expressly confers upon
local governments the power to "adopt regulations for land use,
zoning, and historic preservation."
The opposition of all but the pre-1974 home rule governments
might perhaps be countered in two ways. First, if the legislature
wished, it could neutralize the arguments of post-1974 home rule
units and all non-home rule units by expressly denying them the
power to exercise zoning powers in a manner inconsistent with the
legislation proposed by Louisiana Speaks.
Second, the article VI, section 17 argument may possibly be
rebutted by invoking the section's introductory language,
"[s]ubject to uniform procedures established by law." This
direction to the state legislature, it might be contended, is intended
to ensure that foundational land use legislation "uniformly" defines
the land use playing field for all local governments. The argument
is not without substantial appeal. But it will be met with the
response that the records of the 1974 Constitutional Convention
"clearly indicate that the intent of . . . [this language] was to
provide for due process hearings as established by the
Legislature, ' 8° not to grant the legislature authority to withdraw
land use powers from local governments or to shape the power's
substantive use.
78. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
79. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(E). Article VI, section 7(A) provides that
electors in non-home rule jurisdictions may adopt measures granting the
jurisdictions powers or functions so long as neither are "denied by ... [their]
charter[s] or by general law."
80. See Hershman & Mistric, supra note 35, at 296 (citing 19 STATE OF
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS
OCTOBER 2, at 26-62 (1973)).
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Pre-1974 home rule governments can be expected to defend the
retention of their current land use powers by invoking the
reasoning of Justice Dennis, then of the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans
Levee District. The court held that if New Orleans satisfied the
conditions set forth in the opinion, it could invoke its home rule-
based land use powers to require a state-chartered agency to submit
to local land use controls. In an opinion expressly intended to shift
the balance of power to home rule units,82 Justice Dennis reasoned
that pre-1974 home rule units were constitutionally authorized to
initiate land use powers in their charters83 and were constitutionally
immune from the withdrawal of this power by the legislature.8 4 The
only limitation on this home rule power is article VI, section 4's
requirement that its exercise not be "inconsistent with this
constitution."
The Levee District asserted that New Orleans' claimed home
rule power was inconsistent with the constitution because it
violated article VI, section 9(B)'s ban against abridgement of the
state's police power. 85 But Justice Dennis defined three criteria for
claimed abridgements, and required the Levee District to establish
each. The District must show that the local governmental measure
"conflicts with an act of the state legislature that is necessary to
protect the vital interest of the state as a whole"; 86 that the "state
statute and the ordinance are incompatible and cannot be
81. 640 So. 2d237 (La. 1994).
82. Id. at 252.
83. Id. at 245 ("The power to enact and enforce zoning and building laws
plainly falls within the [City of New Orleans's] home rule power to initiate
legislation and regulation. Zoning law and related land use regulations are
based on, and constitute an application or exercise of, legislative power, and in
particular, police power to enact laws for the safety, health, morals,
convenience, comfort, prosperity, and general welfare of the people.").
84. Id. at 245-46 ("The [City of New Orleans] is immune from the power of
the legislature to withdraw, preempt, or deny the city's power to enact and
enforce zoning and building ordinances consistent with the constitution within
its boundaries.").
85. Id. at 249. Article VI, section 9(B) of the state constitution provides
that "[n]otwithstanding any provision of this Article, the police power of the
state shall never be abridged."
86. Id. at 252.
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effectuated in harmony"; s7 and that "the protection of such state
interest cannot be achieved through alternate means significantly
less detrimental to home rule powers and rights."
88
Will supporters of the Louisiana Speaks legislation prevail in
their claim that the pre-1974 home rule units' retention of their
current land use powers "abridges" the state's police power? The
response is likely to depend upon two principal considerations.
One is a showing that the matters addressed by the statute meet my
earlier definition of a "regional" interest as one that "affects public
health, safety and welfare with sufficient intensity to justify the
state's direct or delegated use of its police power to mandate the
utilization of regional values in management of the activity."
89
The obvious purpose of this demanding language is to establish
that the legislation, in Justice Dennis's terms, "is necessary to
protect the vital interests of the state as a whole."
90
Of equal importance will be the manner in which the
hypothetical legislation is drafted. Its preface should clearly
establish the regional character of the problem being addressed, the
intractability of the conflict between the statute and the current
allocation of land use powers, and the absence of less intrusive
alternatives for protecting the vital state interests at stake. When
possible, moreover, governmental compliance should be secured
through incentives, rather than mandates. The carrots over sticks
approach engages difficult trade-offs, of course. Allowing local
governments to opt out avoids the home rule problem altogether
since those residual powers remain intact. Considering that East
Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and Jefferson Parish are among the
pre-1974 home rule local governments, however, a decision on
their part to opt out could undermine the Regional Plan, unless a
core set of provisions of indisputable state interest remain
mandatory.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra text accompanying note 32.
90. Bd of Comm'rs, 640 So. 2dat251.
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III. THE 2006 EMINENT DOMAIN AMENDMENTS: NOTES FOR A
DEFINITIVE ANALYSIS
An Exchange between two Louisiana lawKyers: How is the
2006 passage of the constitutional amendments to article 1,
section 4 like the United States engagement in Iraq?
Answer: Getting in was easy, living with it is hell; and
getting out will test the wizardry of a Merlin.
The contradiction was stark.
Within hours after Katrina, Louisianans were venting justified
outrage at the government's failure to intervene vigorously on their
behalf. Yet within relatively few months, they and their legislators
voted to weaken one of the state's most potent weapons in the
uphill battle for recovery that lay ahead: the Louisiana
Constitution's article I, section 4 eminent domain power. The vote
implemented three amendments that, depending upon their
interpretation, could cripple the government's use of eminent
domain to reconfigure, resettle, and redevelop the wreckage visited
by Katrina and Rita.
Whether and to what extent the state's courts will interpret the
amendments in this manner is another question for the future. 91
What cannot be questioned is that the amendments have left a
scarred, even schizophrenic document.
Economic development is now expunged as an article 1,
section 4 "public purpose." The ambit of the public purpose
concept has been shrunk. Ambiguity shrouds not only article 1,
section 4, but other constitutional and statutory provisions that find
their measures either in "public purpose," "economic
development," or both.
Juxtaposed against this retreat from economic development is
Louisiana's feverish and continuing pursuit of . . . economic
development. State and local governments continue as before,
pursuing an array of public/private partnerships, cooperative
ventures, tax increment financing projects, and aggressive efforts
91. See Jennie Jackson Miller, Comment, Saving Private Development:
Rescuing Louisiana from Its Reaction to Kelo, 68 LA. L. REv. 631 (2008) for a
detailed study of the impetus surrounding one of the amendments and the
author's recommendations for its interpretation.
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to induce mega-projects to bring their promise of jobs and
prosperity to the state.
92
The following narrative opens with a brief consideration of
Kelo v. City of New London,93 which occupies a role in the eminent
domain brouhaha not dissimilar to that played by the weapons of
mass destruction misconception in Iraq. It then summarizes the
amendments' changes and the possible legal issues they portend,
and concludes with some preliminary observations that may prove
useful in monitoring the inevitable legal warfare that lies ahead.
A. Kelo: The Seven Words
It is unnecessary to recount the Kelo saga in depth because
outstanding accounts are available elsewhere. 94 If nothing else,
however, the case reminds us of the power of a pithy phrase to stir
the pot. The wordsmith in question is Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor; the forum, her dissenting opinion in Kelo. Dismayed
by her colleagues' approval of New London's expropriation of
unblighted private property, she despaired that as a consequence of
their position nothing prevented the state from "replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton." 95 With these seven words, Mrs.
Kelo, the owner of the unblighted property, became the Poster
92. These activities find their legal authorization in, among others,
Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 33:9021-28 (authorizing local governments
to enter into cooperative endeavors with public or private partners and to
approve the establishment of economic development corporations to secure the
"public purpose" of maintenance of the local economy) and Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 33:9029.2 (permitting the state, in addition to its general
authority to enter into cooperative endeavors under Louisiana Constitution
article VII, section 14(C), to enter into cooperative endeavor agreements for
maintenance of the state's economy). In further aid of economic development
article VI, section 21 of the state constitution permits local governments and
other political subdivisions and public port commissions, if authorized by the
state, to expropriate private property and transfer it to private entities in order to
attract industrial plant development.
93. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
94. See, e.g., Marc Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and
the Supreme Court: Kelo v. City of New London, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS 41 (Vt. J. Envtl. L. 2006), available at http://www.vjel.
org/books/pdf/PUBS 10003.pdf, Miller, supra note 91.
95. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503.
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Woman for a national crusade to preclude the use of eminent
domain solely for the community's economic development.
Assessed in the blander language of the law, Kelo's issue was
whether the Federal Fifth Amendment's requirement that private
property may only be expropriated for a "public use" was violated
by a community redevelopment scheme in which unblighted
property was taken for a project designed to advance the
community's "economic development." 96 In responding positively,
the Court's majority was simply following unambiguous
precedent, 97 including an opinion earlier penned by Justice
96. This is indeed the verbiage employed in the majority and dissenting
opinions and by many commentators, and it has bled into Louisiana's
amendment of article I, section 4 of the state constitution. See generally Miller,
supra note 91. This report is not the place for confronting the tyranny of the
phrase "economic development" for its utter lack of content and for the
misconceptions its spawns of how urban renewal/public private partnerships of
the type undertaken in New London actually function. For a knowledgeable
account of both written by one experienced in such efforts, see Mihaly, supra
note 94. One would never know from the Kelo opinions, public comment on
them, or the Louisiana amendments that the City of New London was seeking to
address the very same range of problems, exclusive of flooding, that beset New
Orleans-pre- and post-Katrina--on all sides: population loss, poverty and
unemployment, displacement of major employers and industry, inferior public
education and health facilities and services, and a depressing array of other
urban ills. To collapse the values associated with combating these ills into
something called "economic development" is as callous as portraying the city as
a behemoth running roughshod over its undefended citizens; hence the earlier
suggestion in text aligning "economic development" in the urban redevelopment
context with "weapons of mass destruction" in the Iraq context.
97. The U.S. Supreme Court case of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954),
sustaining the use of eminent domain for urban renewal, put this question to rest
a half-century earlier by equating the Fifth Amendment's "public use" with
"public purpose," the police power's expansive measure. Strikingly, the public
use vs. public purpose question is absent in Louisiana because article 1, section
4 of the state constitution expressly measures the scope of the state's eminent
domain power on the basis of "public purpose," not public use. The Louisiana
courts have followed the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive Fifth Amendment
reasoning. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So. 2d 962
(La. App. 2d Cir. 2001); Town of Vidalia v. Unopened Succession of Ruffin,
663 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1995); Bd. of Comm'rs New Orleans
Exhibition Hall Auth. v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 625 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1993); see also Miller, supra note 91, at 647-5 1.
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O'Connor.9
8
Although Justice O'Connor wished to shrink the ambit of the
public use construct in her dissent, she certainly did not undertake
to emasculate it. The fundamental difference between her position
and that of the majority is easily stated. The latter finds a "public
use" in the prospective benefits, such as economic development,
anticipated in consequence of the expropriation exercise; she
insists that there must be a pre-existing "affirmative harm on
society," the remedying of which affords the basis for the public
use determination.
99
While not insignificant, this dispute moves within a narrow
range that is easily defined and clearly bounded. The question for
the Louisiana courts will be whether and to what extent they will
interpret Louisiana's 2006 constitutional amendments as respecting
these bounds or, instead, as breaching them to undermine eminent
domain's use to enable the state to recover from the nation's
greatest natural disaster.
B. The Amendments
Quotations from the article I, section 4 and related amendments
are set forth in italics below.
Section 4(B)(1): Property shall not be taken or damaged...
(a) for predominant use by any private person or entity," or (b) for
transfer of ownership to any private person or entity.
As drafted, this provision dictates a restraint on the eminent
domain power that is independent of the amendment's subsequent
narrowing of "public purpose" and its exclusion of "economic
development" from that concept.
If "for" means "in order to secure," then eminent domain is
dead as a tool for the public/private partnerships, cooperative
ventures, or the traditional government/private redeveloper urban
renewal model. Under this interpretation, whenever government
condemns property and transfers it to a private party for occupation
or ownership, it violates the ban on taking property from A and
98. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that
expropriation of groundleases for transfer of fee titles to groundlessees is a
"public use").
99. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500.
[Vol. 68
TWO YEARS AND COUNTING
giving it to B that the United States Supreme Court proclaimed in
its 1780 decision, Calder v. Bull.'00
The interpretation would also create the anomaly that "private"
entities endowed with eminent domain powers for uses expressly
approved in the amendments' 0 1 would not be able to exercise the
power because doing so would result in the ownership, if not also
the predominant use, of the condemned land by a "private . . .
entity"-namely, themselves.
If the term "for" is descriptively neutral on the other hand, the
way is opened for an interpretation that avoids Calder v. Bull, and,
not incidentally, comports with a half-century of practice or more.
No problem is posed by either "predominant use by" or "transfer
of ownership" to a private entity when the goal of the program in
which eminent domain is employed serves an independent and
constitutionally recognized public purpose. The private entity's
engagement becomes a mere instrument for achieving the goal, and
hence the public purpose. Illustrative of a private entity in this
context is the purchaser of a subsidized, formerly flooded but now
rehabilitated New Orleans East cottage, or the developer to whom
the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority transferred this and
other properties in the neighborhood (after acquiring them through
eminent domain) on the condition that they be rehabilitated on
behalf of the purchaser. 1
02
100. 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
101. Article I, section 4(B)(2)(a), for example, includes as a public purpose
the so-called "common carrier" provision, which legitimates government's
delegation of its eminent domain power to private entities such as railroads and
other providers of public services or accommodations. A "public purpose" is
served because, in the amendment's terms, it grounds "a general public right to a
definite use of the property," even though this property is privately owned. See
Miller, supra note 91 at 656-57, 668.
102. The hypotheticals in the text avoid references to the venues in which the
CPRA is likely to be active because the eminent domain amendments will
probably prove far less problematic, if problematic at all, for it than for urban
redevelopment authorities. Article I, section 4(B)(2)(b)(iii) includes as serving a
"public purpose". "drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and navigational
protection and reclamation for the benefit of the public generally." Lands
condemned by the CPRA will, I assume, remain in public ownership, thereby
avoiding the problems arising under article I, section 4(B)(1) (private use or
transfer to private ownership) and article I, section 4(G)'s constraints on the sale
or lease of property within 30 years of its condemnation.
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Section 4(B)(2): As used in Subparagraph (1) of this
Paragraph and in Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution,
"'public purpose " shall be limited to the following."
The term "public purpose" appears in various constitutional
provisions other than article I, section 4 and article VI, section 23,
including, among others, those addressing government's power to
control land use, 10 3 to tax, 104 to appropriate funds, 1°5 to pledge
public funds, credit or property, or to enter into cooperative
ventures. 0 7 One of the amendments' principal changes is the
exclusion of "economic development" from the "public purpose"
concept.
Is economic development also excluded as a predicate for
government's exercise of these other enumerated powers? If it is,
must activities under these provisions that are supportive of
economic development be discontinued? Or is the language "as
used in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and in Article VI,
Section 23" intended to partition these sections off from the rest of
the constitution and be applicable only to the purposes for which
the article I, section 4 version of eminent domain may be
employed?
How will courts deal, moreover, with a case in which
government utilizes eminent domain as a direct component of a
program enacted under one of these other provisions? Consider,
for example, eminent domain's use as a component of a
public/private partnership envisaging a community's economic
development and structured as a cooperative venture under article
VII, section 14(C)? Having walled off article 1, section 4 because
its concept of "public purpose" excludes "economic development,"
would the court imply a second source of eminent domain power
that would be consistent with its use for economic development
purposes? 108
103. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
104. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
105. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
106. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(B)(3).
107. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(C).
108. The question is hardly fanciful. Note that while the article 1, section 4
version of the eminent domain power excludes its use for economic
development, the article VI, section 21 version allows its use for this purpose.
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If eminent domain is unavailable in such cases, we are still left
with the anomaly that article VI, section 23 (which is mentioned
thrice in the amendments and is the umbrella provision for local
government's acquisition of property) is not limited to acquisition
by eminent domain and draws no distinction between movable and
immovable "property."' 0 9 If economic development is ruled out as
a "public purpose" under article VI, section 23, are Louisiana
public agencies now precluded from buying pencils or computers
if either are to be used by public employees in programs designed
to stimulate economic development?
Section 4(B)(2)(c): [A public purpose includes] the removal of
a threat to public health or safety caused by the existing use or
disuse of the property.
On its face, this provision would appear to incorporate Justice
O'Connor's view that eminent domain's purpose is to remedy an
existing "harm to society," rather than achieving a prospective
benefit by acquiring and transferring ownership of property that,
by itself, is not socially problematic.
What is encompassed within the amendment's incorporation of
the terms "public health" and "safety" and its perhaps significant
exclusion of the term "general welfare"?" 0 This will be one of the
amendments' hard-fought battlegrounds in the future.
Those who push for the narrowest of interpretations will argue
that the absence of the phrase "general welfare" demands that a
"threat to public health or safety" calls for something akin to an
outbreak of meningitis or the collapse of public order. Those
The more difficult question posed is whether the absence of a specific reference
to eminent domain in article VII, section 14(C) implies both that this section
lacks it own "paired" version of eminent domain, and that the power, if it is to
be used at all, must be the article I, section 4 version. But the latter outcome is
tantamount to saying that eminent domain cannot be used at all because article I,
section 4 rules out its use for economic development purposes.
109. Article VI, section 23 provides that "[s]ubject to and not inconsistent
with this constitution and subject to restrictions provided by general law,
political subdivisions may acquire property for any public purpose by purchase,
donation, expropriation, exchange, or otherwise." (emphasis added).
110. The classical formulation of the scope of government's police power is
that it extends to "health, safety, and general welfare." Occasionally the term
"morals" may also be included in the enumeration.
2008]
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supporting a broader interpretation will be quick to point out that
few terms are as malleable as "public health" or "safety."
Correctly, they will note, public health goals underpin most of the
vast corpus of federal environmental law, while "safety" afforded
the Eisenhower-era predicate for constructing the nation's entire
interstate highway system as an instrument of national defense.
It would seem difficult to deny that public health and safety
occupy a substantial presence in blight removal statutes-a likely
source of continuing controversy under Section 4(B)(2)(c). Justice
O'Connor's assault on economic development as the basis for
eminent domain in Kelo, it merits emphasis, in no way impugned
bona fide blight removal. On the contrary, her criticism of the
expropriation of the plaintiff landowners' property was largely
premised on the fact that it was not blighted.
Section 4(B)(2)(c) contains a reference to "the" property. The
question it poses is whether the expropriating agency must show
that each individual parcel within the targeted assemblage presents
a threat to health and safety, or whether it is sufficient that the
threat derives instead from the aggregate state of the assemblage.
Justice O'Connor did not have to address this question because
the Kelo assemblage was not blighted. The United States Supreme
Court resolved essentially the same question in favor of the
aggregate alternative in an opinion upholding acquisition of an
unblighted property that was part of a blighted neighborhood.'
The Louisiana courts have utilized a similar "tout ensemble"
rationale in the parallel context of permitting the regulation of a
non-historic building in a historic district populated largely by
historic structures."
2
Subsection 4(B)(3): [Excluded from the "public purpose"
concept are] economic development, enhancement of tax revenue,
or any incidental benefit to the public.
This amendment could be an unproblematic application of
Justice O'Connor's objection to the use of eminent domain to
generate prospective benefits (economic development and
enhancement of tax revenue being the obvious candidates), rather
111. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
112. See City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d 798 (La. 1953).
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than to remedy an existing harm. Or it could comprehend a great
deal more.
The obvious problem is that, like "public health" or "safety,"
"economic development" is a term of endless elasticity, particularly
for the litigation-inclined or for the conservative bond attorney
called upon to write an opinion letter. In fact, it can be argued that
any activity undertaken on behalf of Louisiana's pre- and, most
certainly, post-recovery advances "economic development."
Certainly, such has been the position of the state's last two
administrations, who have brought within the phrase's mantra
concerns as varied as improving citizen healthcare, public safety,
highway construction, avoidance of metropolitan sprawl,
workforce training and job creation generally, coastal restoration
and protection, primary and secondary education, and an unlimited
range of other public goods.
Will the courts divide the genus "economic development" from
these multiple species and permit the use of eminent domain to
support the latter? Or will they collapse the species into the genus
and invalidate eminent domain's use?
Section 4(H)(1): [T]he state or its political subdivisions shall
not sell or lease property, which has been expropriated and held
for not more than thirty years [without first offering it to the prior
condemnee or its successor; if the offer is refused, the property
can] only be transferred by competitive bid open to the general
public.
Section 4(H)(1) may prove to be the most problematic of all the
amendments. To illustrate, let us assume an exercise of eminent
domain by the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority that does not
run afoul of the limitations considered to this point. Let us assume
further that under traditional urban renewal practice, the Authority
has pre-selected a developer with a proven urban renewal track
record. Finally, let us posit that through difficult and delicate
negotiations, the Authority has agreed to write down the price of the
condemned assemblage to a level enabling the developer to build
housing priced for a low and moderate income population and to
comply with the host of other redevelopment conditions serving the
community's recovery needs.
How will section 4(H)(1) impact the proposed project? On its
face, it will impact the section in the same way a poison pill impacts
2008]
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a corporate takeover attempt. In fact, the section renders the
hypothetical improbable from the outset. Even if a transfer were
otherwise possible, it would have to be accomplished by
"competitive bid open to the general public," rather than by the
Authority's pre-selection of the developer. Likewise, it is difficult
to see how, given the competitive bid requirement, a write-down
price for the property could be established by the two. Absent a
write-down in addition to any number of other concessions, it is
equally difficult to see how the economics of the situation would
permit the construction of a low/moderate or mixed income project.
Then, of course, there are the barriers posed by the thirty year
duration of a right of first refusal in the condemnee or his
successors. Will condemnees demand their property back as Mrs.
Kelo would presumably have done? Will they instead threaten to
exercise their rights of first refusal to extract from the developer a
premium on top of the write-down price? If the latter becomes a
widespread practice among condemnees, what impacts will it have
on project delays and the inflation of land prices? These questions
can be multiplied indefinitely.
We ought never to underestimate the ingenuity of the
marketplace or of public/private partnerships in finding a way
through barriers that seem impenetrable at first blush. Perhaps
section 4(H)'s barrier can be made to yield. If not, there are other
paths that may be worth exploring.
One is to explore avoiding section 4(G)'s sale or lease
restrictions altogether by arranging the transfer of the condemned
property as a donation. Louisiana Constitution article VII, section
14(B)(6) exempts from its ban on the "donation" of a political
subdivision's property the "donation of abandoned or blighted
housing property... to a nonprofit organization which is recognized
by the Internal Revenue Service as a 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4)
nonprofit organization and which agrees to renovate and maintain
such property until conveyance of the property by such
organization." Perhaps this provision's companion statute,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:4717.3, can be reworked to
overcome the foregoing barriers although the constitutional
provision's restriction of donations to "housing property" will
undoubtedly chafe.
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A more aggressive approach that merits careful research and
evaluation than is possible in this paper would seek to qualify the
developer/redevelopment authority relationship as a "cooperative
endeavor" under article VII, section 14(C). In truth, these
community improvement arrangements may accurately be viewed
as the precursors, if not the actual embodiments, not only of these
endeavors but of the contemporary public/private partnerships
generally. Perhaps the most difficult question that would arise in
this investigation is the one raised, but not resolved in City of
Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp.' 13: under what circumstances, if
any, may a local government expropriate private property and
transfer it to a private party for non-industrial public purposes (that
may include either economic development or blight removal-based
urban renewal) within the framework of an article VII, section 14(C)
cooperative endeavor?
IV. CONCLUSION
The term "conclusion" is the most inapt possible for a report that
has set so many rabbits running. Rather than seeking to conclude a
conversation barely begun, I am content simply to recall my
introductory observation that the "hurricanes mercilessly exposed,
but did not create" the planning/legal issues outlined in this report.
113. 794 So. 2d 962 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2001).
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